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The 'Imperfective-Paradox' Paradox and other
Problems with the Semantics of the Progressive
Aspect
Stefan Engelberg
This paper is about the meaning of the
progressive aspect, of which it has been
notoriously difficult to give a satisfying
account. 1 A number of intriguing properties
of its meaning were first brought out in
formal semantic treatments. An eventsemantics approach to the progressive that
integrates concepts of nonnality and
perspective as well as adequate lexical
representations seems to be particularly
promising. In section 1 I will present several
problems connected with the semantics of
the progressive that are crucial for shaping
its truth conditions. Several solutions to
these problems that have been suggested in
the literature will be discussed. 2 In section 2
I will sketch a preliminary account of the
meaning of the progressive aspect. In section
2.1 the basic components that underlie the
truth conditions of the progressive will be
described. In section 2.2 I will present
underlying lexical assumptions and the truth
conditions for the progressive. Finally, in
section 2.3, I will evaluate the proposal by
revisiting the problems discussed.

1 Seven problems out of many
The imperfective paradox: One of the
widespread traditional ideas about the
meaning of the progressive conveys that
sentences in the progressive aspect refer to
events in progress, i.e., events that are not
yet completed. This can be illustrated by a
very simple scenario:

Scenario A: Rebecca stepped onto the street,
walked towards the other side (l), and
reached the sidewalk .
While this scenario can be described by a
sentence in the simple past (1 a), the event in
progress at reference time l can be referred
to by a sentence in the progressive, as in
(lb).
(1) a. Rebecca crossed the street
b. Rebecca was crossing the street

This leads to a very straightforward idea that
has been formulated in tenns of interval
semantics by BelIDett and Pariee (1972) and
that can be rendered in event semantics as in
PI:
(Pt) The Extensional Approach

PROG(p) is true if the event e described
by PROG(p) is part of an event e'
described by p.
Pt requires that the sentence in the simple

foml p be true in order for the progressive
sentence PROG(p) to be true. But this is
wrong. Another simple scenario shows that
this condition does not, in fact, hold:
Scenario B: Rebecca stepped onto the street,
walked towards the other side (l) when she
stumbled over a pothole and hurt her leg so
badly she didn't reach the sidewalk on the
that other side.
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We can still use (1 b) to refer to this
situation, which shows that the event does
not have to culminate to make the
progressive sentence tme. This observation
involves the well-known imperfective
paradox (cf. Dowty 1979:146): With nonresultative verbs, the progressive sentence
entails the sentence in the simple form (2a),
while this is not the case for resultative
verbs (2b), i.e., verbs that are lexically
marked for a specific result state.
(2) a. [Rebecca was pushing the cart ®
Rebecca pushed the cart]
b. [Rebecca was crossing the street ®
Rebecca crossed the street]
This has led most aspectologists to assume
that some kind of intensionality is involved
in the meaning of the progressive. Thus,
Dowty (1979) provides us with an
intensional version of PI, making use of the
notion of "inertia worlds" which can "be
thought of as worlds which are exactly like
the given world up to the time in question
and in which the future course of events
after this time develops in ways most
compatible with the past course of events."
(Dowty 1979: 148). In event semantics, his
approach aproximately amounts to the
following:
(P2) The Normality Approach
PROG(p) is tme iff in all inertia worlds
the event e described by PROG(p) is pmi
of an event e' described by p.
Thus, according to P2, to evaluate the truth
of a sentence in the progressive we just have
to look at those worlds where everything
proceeds normally.
The interruption problem: Still, P2 cannot

deal with numerous cases. To show this, we
have to bring Rebecca into another
unpleasant situation (cf. Vlach 1981:285f):
Scenario C: Rebecca stepped onto the street,
walked towards the other side very
inattentively (l)while nearby a bus was
approaching her driven by a very inattentive
driver.

If everything proceeds as can be expected
from this course of events, the bus will hit
Rebecca so that she won't reach the other
side. Thus, P2 predicts that ( 1a) is false
under this scenario, but it is not. An
intermption coming from outside the event
we are referring to, no matter if it could be
expected or not, does not affect the tmth of
the progressive sentence. This leads Vlach
(1981 :288) to base the tmth conditions for
the progressive on the possible continuation
of the event referred to:
(P3) The Continuity Approach
PROG(p) is tme iff, in those worlds
where the event e described by PROG(p)
continues after the reference time of
PROG(p), e will be a pmi of an event e'
described by p.
The restriction in P3 allows us to do away
with the bus in Scenario C and just look at
those worlds where the walking event
continues beyond the point where it got
intemlpted in the actual world. But
Landman (1992:12) observed that the event
might have continued beyond this point but
then got intermpted a couple of seconds later
because there was a second bus coming
down the street. According to P3, the
progressive sentence should now be false,
but it is not. Thus, Landman (1992:12)
suggested that to improve P3, the condition
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should include that e continues beyond any
possible intemlption.
The impossibility problem: The tmth
conditions in P3, even in their improved
version, still cannot cope with another
problem, as Landman (1992) observed.
Scenario D: Rebecca was on the beach near

Bristol, England. She went swimming and
swam a couple hundred yards towards the
west (t R).
We can assume that if Rebecca continues
what she is doing at l beyond that time and
the sharks don't get her, she will end up in
Newfoundland eventually. According to P3,
the sentence Rebecca was crossing the
Atlantic should be tme under this scenario,
but it obviously is not. It seems that ifthere
is hardly any chance that the event
culminates, the idea of its unintemlpted
continuation does not license the
progressive. Therefore, Landman (1992:25)
tries to make the concept of "a reasonable
chance on the basis of what is internal to e in
w" part of the tmth conditions of the
progressive. A greatly simplified version of
this is given in P4:
(P4) The reasonable-chance approach
PROG(p) is tme iff, in those worlds
where there are no event-external
intermptions, the event e described by
PROG(p) has a reasonable chance to be
part of an event e' described by p.
The intention problem: P4 still does not
say what distinguishes 'event-external' from
'event-internal' and what counts as a
reasonable chance (cf. Glasbey 1996:334).
Consider the following situation:
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Scenario E: (adapted from Asher 1992:477):

Rebecca, who was very depressed at the
time, wanted to commit suicide and
therefore stepped onto the street and walked
towards the other side (l) in order to get hit
by a bus in the middle of the street.
Under this scenario, (la) is inappropriate. To
make an agentive progressive sentence tme,
the agent should not intend that the event
does not culminate. Landman (1992)
probably would say that if Rebecca does not
even intend to cross the street, the event is
not very likely to culminate. In this case,
(la) would correctly be predicted as false.
But Landman does not discuss this problem.
Naumann and Pifion (1997) try to account
for the intention problem more directly and
assume that for a sentence in the progressive
to be tme, the possible agent of the event
referred to must - at reference time - be able
to bring the event to its culmination and may
not intend to not carry out the whole event.
Somewhat simplified, their approach looks
like this:
(PS) The intention-and-ability approach
PROG(p) is tme iff there is a world w
where the event e described by PROG(p)
is part of an event e' described by p, and
iff the agent (ifthere is one) is able to
bring e to a culmination and does not
intend the non-culmination of e.
But this seems to be too strict. According to
PS, the sentences in (3) should be
impossible since it is explicitly expressed
that the agent intends the non-culmination of
the event, but they are not. 3 Intention seems
to be an important parameter in the tmth
conditions of the progressive, but it is not a
necessary condition for agentive progressive
sentences.
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(3) a. John intended not to kill Rebecca,but,
nutritionally ignorant, he was killing
her by feeding her too much tasty,
but greasy, food
b. Although she really intended not to
do it, she was making him a
millionaire by placing all his money
on the skinniest nag at the races
The perspective problem: Another problem
is brought up by Landman (1992:30f) in the
appendix of his paper. It is illustrated by the
following scenari0 4 :

Scenario F: Rebecca was on a plane to
Boston, which had started at nine o'clock; at
ten o'clock (l), hijackers forced the captain
to fly to Bismarck, North Dakota, where
the plane landed at eleven o'clock.
Under this scenario we can truthfully utter
not only (4a), but also (4b). This is
surprising, since according to the semantics
of negation, either p or not-p should be true,
but not both. This cannot be explained by
any of the approaches discussed.
(4) a. Rebecca was flying to Boston when
the plane was hijacked
b. Rebecca was flying to Boston; well,
in/act, she wasn't, she was flying to
Bismarck, but she didn't know that
at the time
It seems that in (4a) we adopt a perspective
that is different from the one we choose in
(4b). In (4a) the actual outcome of the event
does not playa role; I will call this the
'intensional perspective.' (4b), in contrast, is
vieweci as if from a later point of view. It
takes the outcome of the event in the actual
world into consideration; I will call this the
'extensional perspective.'s

The 'imperfective-paradox' paradox:
Among the problems that one comes across
when thinking about the progressive is a
problem which is of a more lexical nature
(cf. Engelberg 1998:308ff):

Scenario G: In court, the judge examines a
witness; it is known that the witness
observed all the incidents relevant to the
case in question (from at least five o'clock to
five fifteen) ...
Ignorant judge: "What was happening at
five o'clock?"
Omniscient witness:"] was standing at
the window at five and] saw that
Rebecca was killing Jamaal while Linda
was drying her hair. "

... (Scenario Gl) At five fifteen Jamaal was
dead and meanwhile (because her hairdryer
had broken or she had just decided to do so)
Linda had stopped drying her hair, which
was still pretty wet.
... (Scenario G2) At five fifteen Linda's hair
was dry and J amaal wasn't dead, since
Rebecca had stopped strangling him
(because the rope had broken or she had
changed her mind).
Under scenario G 1, the witness told the
truth; he didn't commit himself to the claim
that Linda dried her hair completely. But
under scenario G2 wecannot accept his
testimony that Rebecca was killing J amaal,
since he knew that Jamaal survived. 6 The
expecteci imperfective paraciox cioesrrt show
up, since we tend to conclude that Jamaal
was dead afterwards. This is the
'imperfective-paradox' paradox. The
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following examples show that the denial of
the event's culmination is nearly impossible
for the progressive of some verbs:
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2 The meaning of the progressive
aspect
2.1 The ingredients

(5) a. At five, Linda was drying her hair;
but in the end, it wasn't completely
dry.
b. ??At five, Rebecca was killing
Jamaal; but in the end, he wasil 't
dead.
c. At five, she was crossing the Red
Square; but in the end, she hadn't
completely crossed it.
d. ?? At five, she was burning down the
house; but in the end, she hadn't
burnt it down.

The 'complex-event' problem: The last
problem I want to discuss briefly shows up
with verbs denoting causative events.
Scellario H: Jamaal was attacking Rebecca
with a knife and stabbed her a couple of
times (l\ whereupon Rebecca collapsed;
lying on the floor (l2), she died in a few
minutes.
. to t1le re fierence tIme
.
Refernng
t Rl sent ence
(6a) is perfect, while the same sentence
uttered with respect to l2 is false. According
to the approaches discussed so far, this is
unexpected. If we assume that to kill means
something like 'cause to die,' what is
.
.
happenmg
at t lU- IS
part 0 f t1le event
described in (6b). For causative verbs whose
causing sub event precedes the caused
subevent, the progressive has to be related to
the first, causing sub event.
(6) a. Jamaal was killing Rebecca
b. Jamaal killed Rebecca

Mereological relations: The truth
conditions should express that the event e
described by PROG(p) is a part of an event
e ' described by p, where e ' can occur in a
non-actual world. A part should be
understood as a 'natural part,' which is not a
mere temporal stage but something whose
particular properties allow it to be delineated
from other units. For example, a particular
baseball game has as its parts a particular
homenm, a particular catch, or a particular
fast ball. Any natural part of an event is a
sub event, i.e., an event itself which is
temporally related to all other subevents.
With respect to events referred to by
causative verbs like to dry, a causing event
(i.e., the action perfonned by the agent on
the theme entity) and a caused event (i.e.,
the theme entity becoming dry) can be
distinguished as immediate subevents (see
section 2.2).
The interruption condition: In section 1 it
was shown that certain kinds of external
intemlptions must be abstracted away from
when judging the truth of a progressive
sentence. The following scenario (adapted
from Asher 1992) will show that Landman's
(1992) vague idea of what is internal to the
event is too generous.
Scenario I: Rebecca stood in front of a huge
minefield, started walking, and walked about
R
50 yards into the minefield (t ).
Under this scenario, the sentence Rebecca is
crossing the minefield should be odd, since
i) it is almost impossible that Rebecca
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complete her crossing and ii) what is
happening with the minefield (e.g. exploding
mines) can be considered event-internal
because the minefield occupies an eventrelated argument position. But most
speakers find the sentence acceptable. Thus,
a more restricted notion of what is internal
to the event seems to be in order. I will
assume that only so-called 'agent-internal
intemlptions' affect the tmth of the
progressive. These agent-internal
intermptions have their origin in the
immediate domain of the proto-agene; they
include wrong or missing intentions and
abilities or sudden changes in intention,
ability, or physical structure of the agent. All
other intelTUptions are considered external,
e.g., the bus in scenario C and the exploding
mines in scenario I.

The normality condition: Having
abstracted away from external intermptions,
the culmination of the event has to be
modally restricted in a celiain way to make
the progressive sentence true. Some have
suggested that the culmination has to be
possible (Glasbey 1996, Naumann and
Pifion 1997), some have assumed that there
has to be a reasonable chance of culmination
(Landman 1992)8, and other approaches
might even imply that the culmination has to
be probable to make the progressive tme. 9
I'm not
quite sure if a mere possibility condition
might be too weak, but a probability
lO
condition is definitely too strong :
Scenario J: Jamaal was participating in an
amateur tightrope-walking contest. He
usually falls off the rope three out of four
times. He started walking on the rope that
was tightened across the arena and took a
couple of steps (t R ).

This scenario can be easily referred to with
Janzaal was crossing the arena, showing
that even if it is only remotely possible that
the crossing is completed, the progressive
can be used. For the time being, I will
assume that the modal part just says that,
external intemlptions aside, the completion
of the event must be possible. II

Perspective: The tmth of a sentence in the
progressive has to be evaluated with respect
to perspective. To keep things as simple as
possible, I will assume that there are just two
perspectives, an extensional one and an
intensional one, where the choice of a
perspective is detennined by semantic and
pragmatic factors. We can conceive
perspectives as functions from events to sets
of worlds. The extensional perspective (i)
assigns the actual world to the event, the
intensional perspective (ii), and assigns to
the event all worlds in which the event is not
externally intermpted:
(7) a. PerspEXT(e) = {wo}
b. Pers/NT(e) = {w I e is not =stopped
in w by agent-external
intemlptions}

2.2 The recipe
Lexical entries: As section 1 has shown, the
lexical influence on the interpretation of
sentences in the progressive has to be taken
into consideration. With some verbs (to kill,
to burn down), the result state is somehow
prominent. These verbsevoke the
'imperfective-paradox' paradox.
Furthennore, with verbs like to kill which
involve more than one subevent, the
progressive is related to the first subevent. I
will therefore assume that the meaning of
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verbs is expressed by lexical-event
structures that capture these differences.
Lexical-event structures contain variables
1
7
for e and e- as subevents, s as a result state,
'*' as an indicator of a prominent result state,
'<' as a temporal precedence relation, and
'<>' as a relation of temporal overlap. 12
l

(8) a. to kill: e </<>CAUSE e] < s*
b. to cross: e l < s
(8a), for example, expresses that a killing
involves a first causing subevent (the agent
acting upon the theme), a second temporally
parallel or following caused subevent (the
theme referent dying) and a result state (the
being dead of the theme referent). This result
state is marked as prominent. 13 The meaning
of this notion is admittedly vague. I suspect
that either causative verbs that are rather
unspecific with respect to the activities in
the first subevent, or verbs with resultative
particles involve prominent result states.
Thus, the prominence marker might tum out
to be derivable from other lexical
infom1ation.

Truth conditions: As a starting point for a
more refined theory of the progressive, I will
assume that the progressive is a three-place
relation PROG(e,E,Persp) with the
following truth conditions:
(P6) The perspective approach
PROG(e,E,Persp) is true iff
(i) there is an event e' and a world wI
Persp(e) such that e' occurs in wand
e is a part of e',
(ii) e is of event-type E where E is the
VP translation and is associated with
its lexically projected event structure
LESE,
(iii) e occurs in the actual world wO at
reference time l and has all of the
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properties that are specified in LESE
for the first subevent of e'.

Choice of perspective: Finally, I will give a
list of the semantic and pragmatic factors
that determine the choice of perspective. In
some cases, one perspective is forced; in
other cases, both are equally available. The
following list is not meant to be complete:
We tend to choose PerspEXT i) if the
outcome of the event is conversationally
relevant, ii) if adverbials like in fact or
14
actually occur , iii) if the lexically specified
result state is prominent, and iv) ifit is
known that the event culminates. We tend to
NT
choose Pers/ i) if the outcome of the
event is not relevant, ii) if there is no
information about the further course of the
event available, and iii) probably by default.
2.3 Conclusion - the problems revisited
The preceding ideas are not meant to be a
theory of the progressive. They rather serve
to identifY the components that have to go
into the semantics of the progressive. A
strict formalization of this idea is still
another matter. 15 Nevertheless, something
like P6 seems to be on the right track to
solve the problems discussed in section 1:
the imperfective paradox does not occur
because of PersplNT. The intemlption
problem is solved by integrating interruption
in the perspective functions and by
sharpening the border between intemal and
extemal interruptions. The impossibility
problem is done away with by having
introduced a possibility condition into the
truth conditions. The intention problem does
not occur because on the one hand, wrong or
changed intentions are considered intemal
interruptions, and on the other hand, if there
is a denial of the intention to bring the event
to a culmination, the extensional perspective

52

Proceedings of the 1999 Deseret Language and Linguistics Society

is chosen. The perspective problem is solved
by evaluating the truth of progressive
sentences relative to a perspective. And
finally, appropriate lexical representations
help to solve the 'imperfective-paradox'
paradox and the complex-event problem, the
former because prominent result states
trigger PerspEXT, the latter because of the
introduction of condition (ii) in the truth
conditions.
One last remark: I know I put Rebecca
through a hard time. For those of you who
are worrying about her, let me tell you one
thing: she's absolutely fine; right now, she's
crossing the New Jersey Turnpike during
rush hour.
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End Notes
IThis research has been carried out as part of
the project "Theory of the Lexicon" (SFB
282), supported by the German Science
Foundation (DFG). Comments are welcome
and can be sent to engelb@uniwupperta1.de.
2To make these different approaches
comparable, I willrephrase them in terms of
event semantics. Since these reformulations
are, of course, not straightforward
translations of the original proposals, the
criticisms may not always carry over to the
original approaches.
3More precisely, the truth conditions
Naumann and Pifion (1997) give require that
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the speaker believe that the agent does not
intend the non-culmination of the event, but
even for this version the sentences in (3) are
counterexamples.
'+Cf. also Bononi (1997) for more refined
examples of the perspective problem.
sAsher (1992) and Glasbey (1996) employ
different concepts of 'perspective' that I don't
have space to discuss here.
6There is an emphatic reading in which it is
understood that the killing is not completed
(I had to interfere; 1 mean, she was killing
him!) which we also get for sentences in the
simple future (She will kill him, 1 have to
interfere!). Both have to be interpreted
counterfactually.
71 use the term 'proto-agent' in the sense of
Dowty (1991). It refers to the eventparticipant that has the most agentive
properties. A proto-agent is not necessarily
an animated being.
8It is not quite clear if a reasonable chance is
at all different from mere possibility.
9Asher (1992) assumes a default implication
relation between the simple and the
progressive sentence, which in some cases
amounts to a probability condition (cf.
Glasbey 1996).
IOCf. also the examples in Bonomi
(1997: 187).
11I'm aware that this is too simple. In
particular, the problem of incompatible
result states has to be taken into the
consideration (c.f., e.g., Dowty 1979.
Naumann and Pinon 1997): Referring to a
falling coin, both sentences the coin is
coming up heads and the coin is coming up
tails are odd. The progressive does not seem
to be possible if it refers to an event that is
part of several equally probably
culminations of events.
12These are only partial event structures.
Information about semantic relations,
temporal and other properties of subevents is
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left out here. For an overview of this lexical
event structure theory, cf. Engelberg (1999),
and for a more thorough presentation of the
theory, c.f. Engelberg (1998).
13For different purposes, Pustejovsky
(1995:72) employs a similar concept, head
of an event, which he relates to the notion of
fore grounding.
14Under scenario C, these adverbials even
allow one to refer to a miraculous
completion of the event; c.f. the following
example sentence from Landman (1992:30):
1 would never have believed it at the time,
but she was actually crossing the Atlantic.
15 For limits of space, I have not discussed
some recent approaches to the progressive
like Asher (1992), Glasbey (1996), and
Bonomi (1997), which do not change the
overall picture of the problems we are
confronted with very much, but rather
provide interesting formalizations of the
ideas of perspective, interruptions, and
normally using, e.g., non-monotonic
reasoning or channel theory. In particular,
Bonomi's (1997) promising conception of
event stereotypes deserves a more thorough
treatment than I can give here.

